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"The report of my death was an exaggeration. "
-Mark Twain, American author2
I. INTRODUCTION
The reports of a Honduran coup ditat in June 2009 are greatly
exaggerated. The widespread conclusion that Zelaya's removal was a coup
stems from the simplistic argument that the use of uniformed soldiers during
Zelaya's arrest, ipsofacto, makes the removal a coup. But a true coup dtat
requires either some unlawful action that violates the status quo government
3
or a military assumption of power.4 Simply put, the multitude of critics
alleging that Zelaya's removal constituted a coup d',tat made their decision
based on an incomplete understanding of the factual predicate behind the
decision to remove Zelaya.
The essential facts are undisputed. On March 23, President Zelaya
announced his desire to conduct a referendum on whether to convene a
National Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Honduran Constitution (the
Constitution).5 On the same day, the Honduran Attorney General told the
President to stop because such a referendum was unconstitutional.6 On
May 27, the Court of Administrative Disputes concurred with the Attorney
General and issued an injunction stopping all progress on the referendum.7
2 N.Y. JOURNAL, June 2, 1897.
3 See EDWARD LUTTWAK, Coup D'tTAT: A PRACTiCAL HANDBOOK 3-12, 192 (1969). In
this seminal work on the fundamentals of a coup d'itat, Luttwak defines a coup as "the
infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace
the government from its control of the remainder." Id. at 12. The sine qua non of a coup, then,
is the act of "subverting the system of state security." Id. app. B at 192. For a more robust
discussion of what constitutes a coup, see infra Part IV.
4 See ABDuLA. SAID& DANIELM. COLLIER, REVOLuTIONISM 43-44 (197 1) (discussing the
assumption of power of military elites in Africa).
' A note on translations. The Honduran Constitution and the various Honduran legal codes
do not have official English translations. This Article's analysis requires a fairly rigorous
exegesis of the Honduran Constitution, so I have made extensive translations throughout the
Article. In an attempt to increase accountability, I have pasted the Spanish text of the relevant
translated provisions in the footnotes. Additionally, where a particular word has several
applicable English definitions, I have made a note and explained the different possible
connotations of the word.
6 Honduras: Fiscalia desautoriza liamado a consultapopular, LAPRENSA(Hond.), Mar. 25,
2009, available at http://www.laprensa.hn/index.php/PaC3%ADs/Ediciones/2009/03/26/Notic
ias/Honduras-Fiscalia-desautoriza-Ilamado-a-consulta-popular.
' Juzgado de Letras de 1o Contencioso Administrativo [Court of Administrative Disputes],
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Zelaya nevertheless continued his efforts to administer the vote. The courts
issued further orders on May 29 and June 16 to stop the referendum, which
Zelaya also ignored.8 On June 28, 2009, the Honduran Supreme Court of
Justice issued an arrest order for President Zelaya on the grounds that he had
violated, and was continuing to violate, the Honduran Constitution.9 The
Supreme Court also issued an order to enter Zelaya's home to execute the
arrest order.' The Honduran military complied with the judicial mandates,
and removed Zelaya from power. The military then escorted Zelaya to a plane
that took him to Costa Rica." Finally, the Congress passed a resolution
stripping Zelaya of the presidency. 2
The international community immediately condemned the removal as an
illegal coup without explaining why the Supreme Court's orders did not
legitimate the action. 3 The U.S. State Department's analysis is typical of this
kind of simplistic reasoning. When asked whether Zelaya's removal should
properly be classified as a military coup, a senior State Department official said
that the military's mere presence meant it did constitute a coup:
May 27, 2009 (Hond.) (Opinion of Jorge Alberto Zelaya Zaldafia), in PODER JUDICIAL DE
HONDURAS, EXPEDIENTE JUDICIAL RELACION DOCUMENTADA CASO JOSE MANUEL ZELAYA
ROSALES 11 (2009), http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/ [hereinafter DOcu.MENTADACASOZELAYA]
(follow the "Expediente Judicial Relaci6n Documentada Caso Zelaya Rosales" hyperlink).
8 Id.
9 Orden del Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.)
(Order to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 54.
10 Orden del Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.)
(Order to Lieutenant Colonel Don Rene Antonio Hepburn Bueso), in DOCUMENTADA CASO
ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 55.
" Elisabeth Malkin, Honduran President Is Oustedin Coup, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29,2009, at Al.
12 Id.
"3 While the United Nations, G.A. Res. 63/301, 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/301 (July 1,2009),
the Organization of American States (OAS), Resolution on the Political Crisis in Honduras, $ 1,
AG/Res. 1 (XXXVII-E/09) (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.oas.org/documents/OEA-
Hon duras/AG04661E02.doc, President Barack Obama, Transcript of Remarks Following a
Meeting with President Alvaro Uribe Velez of Colombia and an Exchange with Reporters,
DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1, 3 (June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Remarks], available at
http://www.gpoac cess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900518.pdf ("We believe that the coup
was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the President of Honduras, the democratically
elected President there."), and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, see Press Release, U.S. Sec'y
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Situation in Honduras (June 28, 2009), available at
http://www.state. gov/secretary/rm/2009a/06/125452.htm ("The action taken against Honduran
President Mel Zelaya violates the precepts of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and thus
should be condemned by all."), all characterized President Manuel Zelaya's removal as a coup
d'gtat, the lawfulness of President Zelaya's removal is a much more nuanced issue.
[Vol. 38:339
THE HONDURAN CONSTITUTION IS NOT A SUICIDE PACT
Well, I mean, it's a golpe de estado. The military moved against
the president; they removed him from his home and they expelled
him from a country, so the military participated in a coup.
However, the transfer of leadership was not a military action. The
transfer of leadership was done by the Honduran congress, and
therefore the coup, while it had a military component, it has a
larger- it is a larger event.' 4
By failing to recognize that the Honduran military acted in accordance with
lawful civilian orders, the State Department and most international actors
misdiagnosed Zelaya's removal as a coup d'gtat.
This Article argues that Manuel Zelaya's removal did not constitute a coup
d'stat because the Honduran government had a constitutional basis for its
actions against a president that openly ignored the constitution. The Supreme
Court of Justice was justified, as the arbiter of Honduran constitutional law,
to order Zelaya's arrest for crimes against the Constitution. The Honduran
military rightfully complied with a judicial order giving it explicit instructions
in defense of the Constitution. The Honduran Congress was the only
government instrument to operate on shaky legal footing, and even its actions
had a reasonable basis in law. With a full knowledge of the facts, the
unlawfulness of the Honduran government's actions is not at all a clear case.
Instead, lawfulness depends on a difficult balancing test between the letter of
the law and its spirit. This kind of test should be conducted by the world's
authority on Honduran constitutional law: the Honduran Supreme Court of
Justice. The court made its decision, and it is the world's responsibility to
respect it.
Part II of this Article provides the factual context for the current crisis, and
describes how President Zelaya's actions were intricately intertwined with a
growing authoritarianism in the region. Part III analyzes the
unconstitutionality of President Zelaya's call for a "non-binding" referendum.
Part IV examines the legal basis for the actions of the Honduran Supreme
Court, military, and Congress. Part V concludes by arguing that the
international community's condemnation of Zelaya's removal constituted an
improper intrusion into the Honduran Supreme Court's adjudication of the
Honduran Constitution.
"' Press Release, Dep't of State, Background Briefing on the Situation in Honduras (July 1,
2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125564.htm.
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II. THE FOUNDATION FOR REMOVAL: ZELAYA'S CAMPAIGN FOR A
POPULIST REVOLUTION
In order to understand the story behind Zelaya's removal, one must
understand the greater context surrounding President Zelaya's unconstitutional
actions. Zelaya had not simply violated the Honduran Constitution; he had
begun to mirror the authoritarian measures propounded by his allies in
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. 5 From the Honduran Supreme Court's
perspective, Zelaya's actions were the beginnings of an attack on the
fundamental nature of the Honduran state. The Justices believed that they
were Honduran democracy's last bastion against a president intent on
undermining the rule of law and moving the nation towards autocracy. 16 Put
another way, the dispute between Zelaya and the Supreme Court was actually
another chapter in the ongoing Latin American conflict between democracy
and a strain of authoritarian thought known as "Bolivarian populism."
This Article puts Zelaya's actions in context by examining both
international and domestic events. First, this Article describes how similar
actions in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have resulted in growing
authoritarian governments. Second, this Article gives a detailed discussion of
Zelaya's actions and their legal justifications.
A. The International Context: Calling for a Constitutional Constituent
Assembly is the First Step in the Bolivarian Blueprint for Converting a
Democracy into an Autocracy
Bolivarian populism is a brand of Latin American socialism. Championed
by Venezuelan President Hugo Chdvez, Bolivarian populism advances an
egalitarian agenda through progressively authoritarian measures. 7 Over the
past decade, several Latin American presidents have followed Bolivarian
populism's blueprint to power consolidation by: (1) calling for a constitutional
convention to overhaul the existing legal regime, (2) removing term limitations
in order to facilitate indefinite power, (3) undermining coordinate branches of
1 See discussion infra Parts II.A.1.-2.
16 See Brief of Alberto Rubi, Fiscal General de la Repiblica, Corte Suprema de Justicia
[Supreme Court of Justice], June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra
note 7, at 35 (detailing the unconstitutional nature of Zelaya's actions).
11 See Blake Schmidt & Elisabeth MaIlin, Leftist Party Wins Salvadoran Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17,2009, at A5; Alejandro Toledo, Op-Ed., Silence = Despotism, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,2007,
at A23.
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government, and (4) repressing any lingering discontent. As described infra,
President Zelaya had started down this Bolivarian path. This Article now
summarizes the way that leaders have followed the Bolivarian blueprint for
altering democratic governments.
1. Venezuela Sets the Example
Hugo Chdvez is the self-proclaimed leader of the Bolivarian populist
movement. At his January 2007 inauguration, the Venezuelan President
reaffirmed his commitment to his policy agenda, proclaiming "Socialism or
death, I swear it!"'" But Chivez's conception of socialism is not just state
ownership of industries; rather, Chdvez's socialism includes extrajudicial
killings to intimidate opponents, 9 a centralization of power in the executive,2"
and attacks on the coordinate branches of government.2' The Venezuelan
President undertook these steps because he believed that any obstacle to his
self-proclaimed Bolivarian Revolution, whether political or legal, should be
cleared for the greater good.22
In April 1999, ChAvez announced a referendum for the establishment of a
National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to craft a new constitution for the
country. Eighty-five percent of the voters favored the referendum.23
Moreover, 72% of the voters accepted the idea that the newly created
institution would define its own limitations.24 With an ANC composed
"S Simon Romero, Chdvez Begins New Term Vowing Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007,
at A16.
'9 Leo Casey, Venezuela Under Chrivez: Some Truths Are Not All That Complicated,
DIssENT, Summer 2005, at 87,87-88, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?arc
ticle=220.
20 See Larry Rohter, Venezuelan Congress Fights Loss ofPower, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1999,
at A8 (discussing Chivez's usurpation of Congressional authority to pass laws and hold special
sessions).
21 See Venezuela Assembly Starts Purging Judges, N.Y. TIEs, Sept. 9, 1999, at A3
(discussing the ousting of eight judges by the Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly).
22 See Larry Rohter, Venezuelas New Leader: Democrat or Dictator?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10,
1999, at A3 (describing how Chivez vowed to overhaul the government in order to realize his
Bolivarian agenda).
23 David J. Myers, Venezuela: Shaping the "New Democracy," in LATIN AMERICAN
PoLmcs AND DEVELOPMENT 259, 259 (Howard John Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline eds., 5th ed.
2000).
24 Id. at 259-61.
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primarily of those politically and ideologically aligned with him, ChAvez began
to solidify his centralization of power.2"
The ANC began to operate in August 1999.26 While the Venezuelan
Congress and the ANC ostensibly operated under a relationship of
"cohabitation, '27 in reality the Congress was under constant duress from the
ANC. 2' Eventually, cohabitation gave way to complete domination by the
ANC. On August 25, 1999, the ANC stripped the Congress of its right to pass
laws or even meet.2 9 The ANC had completely replaced the preexisting
legislative authority in Venezuela.
Chdvez then set his sights on the judiciary.3" In August 1999, the ANC
declared a "judicial emergency"'" and appointed a commission, staffed by a
majority of Chdvez-supporters, to review claims of corruption and
incompetence among judges and congressmen and the power to fire those
found to be corrupt. 2 While judicial oversight was in no way part of the
ANC's legal mandate,33 the Venezuelan Supreme Court nevertheless upheld
the appointed commission's constitutionality in an eight to six decision.3"
Ironically, the Supreme Court based its argument on the principles of the rule
of law: "The Supreme Court reaffirms its submission to the rule of law and its
willingness to collaborate with other branches of government. It therefore
offers to contribute to the principal aims of the Judicial Emergency Decree."35
2 See Larry Rohter, Venezuelans Give Chdvez All the Powers He Wanted, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1999, at All (discussing the overwhelming vote in favor of a new Venezuelan
Constitution which gave Chdvez sweeping powers).
26 Rohter, supra note 20.
27 Steve Ellner, The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela: The First Year anda Half
in Power, LATiN AM. PERSP., Sept. 2001, at 5, 13.
28 Id. Members of the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) noted that Colombia, unlike
Equador, had successfully suspended Congress in recent history, emboldening their resolve to
do the same in Venezuela. Id.
29 Rohter, supra note 20.
30 Id.
3' Editorial, The Venezuelan Lesson, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at A22.
32 Juan Jesus Aznirez, La presidenta del Supremo venezolano dimite y da por enterrado el
Estado de derecho, EL PAiS EDICION IMPRESA (Spain), Aug. 25, 1999, available at http://www.
elpais.com/articulo/intemacional/SOSA/_CECILIA_NENEZUELA/VENEZUELA/president
a/Supremo/venezolano/dimite/da/enterrado/Estado/derecho/elpepiint/19990825elpepiint4/Tes/.
33 El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [The Supreme Court of Justice], Aug. 23, 1999 (Venez.)
[hereinafter Decision on the Judicial Reorganization Decree], available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/
informacion/acuerdos/acp-23081999.html (discussing the limited nature of the ANC's mandate
and the established Supreme Court precedent limiting the ANC's purview).
34 Id.
" Id. (as translated by author).
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The decision was so controversial that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
Cecilia Sosa, resigned in protest.36
Chief Justice Sosa lamented that the court had "committed suicide to avoid
being murdered."37 President of the Chamber of Deputies, Henrique Capules
Radonsky, echoed Sosa's sentiments and said that the Supreme Court had
acted out of self-preservation:
[T]his action by the [Supreme Court] was an action to preserve
their existence within the republic . . . that there was great
incertitude in these actions by the [Supreme Court] because in
essence the ANC could[,] for example, at any moment in time,
institute the Death Penalty, and there existed no judicial organism
by which an action by the ANC could be declared illegal or
unconstitutional.38
Less than four months after the decision on the judicial reorganization,
Chfivez finally buried the Supreme Court. On December 27, 1999, the ANC
created the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to replace the old Supreme Court. 9
The old Supreme Court Justices were all removed from the judiciary as a new
crop of pro-Chdvez judges took the reins of Venezuela's highest court.4 °
Finally, Chivez began to work on increasing the executive power by
ensuring his own perpetual rule. Article 230 of the previous Venezuelan
Constitution had allowed a president to be reelected only once." Chdvez found
this limitation too constricting, and on February 15, 2009 voters approved a
constitutional amendment removing presidential term limits.42 Chdvez now faces
an easy reelection, and his policies remain unchecked by the coordinate
branches of government.
36 Chdvez's Power Grab, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1999, at 27.
37 Id.
3' Brenda Brown Perez, Judicial Suspensions and Due Process Under Venezuela 's New
Democratic Model, 19 J. NAT'LAss'NADMIN. L. JUDGES 125, 128 (1999).
31 Michael McCaughan, Venezuela Issues Urgent Appealfor Volunteers, IRISH TIMES (Ir.),
Dec. 28, 1999, at 10.
o See Brown Perez, supra note 38, at 128.
CONSTITUCION DE LA REPULICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [Constitution] art. 230.
42 Carmen Gentile, Voters Grant ExtendedRule to Cheivez, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16,2009, at A 1.
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2. Bolivia Follows Chdvez's Example
Bolivian President Evo Morales was the first executive to follow Chivez's
example. One of his first steps after coming to power was to convene a
National Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Bolivian Constitution. The new
draft constitution was put to the voters and approved on January 25, 2009.43
In standard populist fashion, Morales removed the constitutional term
limitation on presidents and added a new Article 168 that will allow him to
serve another term.44 The new constitution includes a litany of other changes
that give the government greater control over the economy, broadens the
nationalization of private industries, 45 and increases the rights of indigenous
people.46
Morales also attacked judicial independence. For example, after several
judges ruled against his expansive socialist programs, Morales publicly
criticized the judges and called for members of the Constitutional Court to be
tried by Congress.47 Morales's threats violated the judicial independence
clause of the Bolivian Constitution, which reads: "The magistrates and judges
are independent in the administration ofjustice and are subordinate only to the
[c]onstitution and the law." '4
In short, Morales has strengthened the power of the Bolivian executive,
undermined private property rights, and attacked the judiciary when it resisted
his progressive agenda. The national referendum for a constituent assembly,
41 Terry Wade, Bolivia's Morales Wins Referendum, Eyes Re-Election, REUTERS, Jan. 26,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE50P43M20090126.
44 CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE LA REPiBLIA DE BOLIVIA [Constitution] art. 168.
41 See Carin Zissis, Bolivia's Nationalization of Oil and Gas, CouNcIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, May 12, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10682/ ("On his hundredth day in
office, Bolivian President Evo Morales moved to nationalize his nation's oil and gas reserves,
ordering the military to occupy Bolivia's gas fields and giving foreign investors a six-month
deadline to comply with demands or leave."). Bolivia also recently joined the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas, a socialist trade group that previously consisted of Cuba and
Venezuela. The new three-nation pact is now calling itself the "Axis of Good." Id.
' Arthur Brice, Bolivian Vote on Constitution Could Help President, CNN, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/01/23/bolivia.referendum.
' Bolivia: IBA Calls on President Morales to Desist from Undermining the Rule of Law,
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, June 25, 2007, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=5DDE8323-44A8-47D2-88D6-E I C045658633.
48 CoNSTrruCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA [Constitution] art. 116, iv ("Los
Magistrados yjueces son independientes en la administraci6n dejusticia y no estin sometidos
sino a la Constituci6n y la ley. No podrfn ser destituidos de sus funciones, sino previa sentencia
ejecutoriada.").
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as it was in Venezuela, was the critical first step in the path to Bolivarian
populism in Bolivia.
3. Ecuador Follows Suit
While Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa started utilizing Bolivarian
blueprint later than Morales, Correa was able to progress more rapidly toward
authoritarianism than his Bolivian counterpart. Step one was to call for a
referendum on whether to convene a constitutional constituent convention.49
Voters approved that referendum in April 2007.50 On September 30, 2007,
Correa's allies won a majority of the seats in the new Constitutional
Constituent Assembly.5 In November 2007, the Constituent Assembly voted
to dissolve the Ecuadorian Congress on its first day of work.
2
On September 28, 2008, Correa's efforts towards a new constitution
reached fruition: voters passed the new document "by a wide margin."53 The
new constitution gave the president extensive new powers54 and the ability to
dissolve Congress at his discretion.55
" See Simon Romero, Another Ecuador Crisis Deepens As a Judge Is Fired Ahead of
Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, at A4 (discussing the building turmoil in Ecuador ahead of
the April 15, 2007 referendum).
" BBC News, Timeline: Ecuador, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1212826.stm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
"1 Stephan Kueffner, Correa Allies Win Ecuador Constitution Assembly Vote, BLOOMBERG,
Oct. 1,2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid'20601086&sid'amtIJmmOT2VA&re
fer=latin america.
52 Timelime: Ecuador, supra note 50.
5" Joshua Partlow & Stephan Ktiffner, Voters in Ecuador Approve Constitution, WASH.
POST, Sept. 29, 2008, at A14.
14 See CONSTrruci6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [Constitution] art. 147 (listing
the powers of the president).
" Id. art. 148 ("La Presidenta o Presidente de la Repfiblica podli disolver la Asamblea
Nacional cuando, a su juicio, 6sta se hubiera arrogado funciones que no le competan
constitucionalmente, previo dictamen favorable de la Corte Constitucional; o si de forma
reiterada e injustificada obstruye la ejecuci6n del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, o por grave crisis
politica y conmoci6n interna. Esta facultad podri ser ejercida por una sola vez en los tres
primeros aflos de su mandato. En un plazo mAximo de siete dias despus de la publicaci6n del
decreto de disoluci6n, el Consejo Nacional Electoral convocari para una misma fecha a
elecciones legislativas y presidenciales par el resto de los respectivos periodos. Hasta la
instalaci6n de la Asamblea Nacional, la Presidenta o Presidente de la Rep~blica podri, previo
dictamen favorable de la Corte Constitucional, expedir decretos-leyes de urgencia econ6mica,
que podrdn ser aprobados o derogados por el 6rgano legislativo.").
349
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B. The Honduran Context: President Zelaya Repeatedly Defied the Rule of
Law in His Attempt to Hold a Referendum on a Constitutional Constituent
Assembly
The Honduran context behind President Zelaya's removal centers around
the President's quest to hold a referendum on whether the country should call
a National Constituent Assembly to overhaul the constitution. As described
supra, the convocation of a Constituent Assembly is usually the first step for
populist leaders who hope to radically change their country's government.
The fact that President Zelaya had come to champion Bolivarian populism
was a surprise to most Hondurans. When Zelaya took office in 2006 as the
leader of one of the country's center-right parties, he advocated for a Central
American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and drew much of his
support from strong alliances with business organizations.56 In 2007, however,
he suddenly proclaimed himself a socialist and incorporated Honduras into
Petrocaribe, a mechanism set up by Hugo Chivez that exchanged oil subsidies
to Latin American and Caribbean countries in exchange for "political
subservience." 7 Zelaya then brought Honduras into the Bolivarian Alternative
for Latin America and the Carribean (ALBA), which is ostensibly a
commercial alliance but in practice is a political force that works to expand
Bolivarian populism."8
But President Zelaya was not content with forging foreign policy alliances
with ChAvez and his allies. He also wanted to follow the next step in the
Bolivarian populism playbook, which was to call a constituent assembly to
overhaul the existing legal structure and consolidate power in the executive.
1. Zelaya Ignored the Judiciary's Decision that the Populist Referendum
was Unlawful
On March 23, 2009, President Zelaya announced Decree PCM-05-2009,
which mandated the National Statistics Institute to conduct a national
referendum on whether to convene a constitutional convention.59 In order to
56 Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Op-Ed., Honduras's Coup Is President Zelaya's Fault, WASH. POST,
July 1,2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/0 1/AR200907010
3210.html.
57 Id.
58 Id.
'9 See Brief of Alberto Rubi, Fiscal General de la Repfiblica, Corte Suprema de Justicia
[Supreme Court of Justice], June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra
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effectuate the referendum, Zelaya had ballots printed in Venezuela and shipped
to Honduras.6'
The Honduran courts found this referendum unlawful. On May 27, 2009,
the Court of Administrative Disputes6' issued an interlocutory injunction to
stop the referendum on the grounds that the referendum would cause
"irreparable damage and prejudice to the country's democratic system in clear
violation of the Constitution of the Republic and other laws."62 The injunction
went on to forbid any action in furtherance of the referendum, suspending "all
effects" of the referendum, including "any type of publicity" about the decree
or "any further proceedings" by the President or the executive branch.63
Zelaya attempted to preempt the court's interference by issuing Executive
Decree PCM- 19-2009 on May 26, the day before the Court of Administrative
Disputes publically announced its opinion. In Executive Decree PCM-19-
2009, Zelaya "annulled" his previous PCM-05-2009 decree, stating that it
"held no value or effect."'  Another new decree (PCM-020-2009), however,
did exactly what PCM-05-2009 had done; it announced a public referendum
on whether there should be a National Constituent Assembly.6 The fact that
a ruling president was arguing that he could get around a judicial opinion by
renaming the contested law would have been comical if it was not such a
telling example of Zelaya's disregard for the rule of law.
Zelaya's transparent and simplistic attempt to make an end-run around
judicial review was swiftly countered by the court. On May 29, the Court of
Administrative Disputes issued a second order to clarify the scope of the
injunction.66 In this May 29 order, the court stated that its previous May 27
note 7, at 35.
0 Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Op-Ed., Honduras Defends Its Democracy, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2009, at Al 1.
61 In Spanish, the "Juzgados de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo."
62 Juzgado de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Court of Administrative Disputes],
May 27, 2009 (Hond.) (Opinion of Jorge Alberto Zelaya Zaldafia), in DOCUMENTADA CASO
ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 11 (as translated by author).
61 Id. ("[E]n consecuencia se suspenden todos los efectos del acto administrativo ticito
impugnudo, de charicter general que contiene el Decreto Ejecutivo PCM-05-2009, del 23 de
marzo del 2009, asi como cualquier tipo de publicidad sobre lo establecido en el mismo; de igual
manera, la suspensi6n del procedimiento de consulta a los ciudadanos por parte del Poder
Ejectivo a traves del Presidenta Constitucional de la Republica, o cualquiera de las instituciones
que componon la estructura administrative del Poder Ejecutivo.").
" Decreto Ejecutivo Nfimero PLM-0 19-2009, 31,945 LA GACETA, June 25, 2009, at Al
(Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 112 (as translated by author).
65 Id. at A3.
"Juzgado de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Court of Administrative Disputes],
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order included "any administrative act ... that has the same goal of the
administrative act that has been suspended, which includes any change in name
of the process, that implies an attempt to avoid compliance with the
interlocutory opinion."'' 7 President Zelaya contested the injunction, but the
appellate court denied his request on June 16, 2009.68
Read together, the May 27, May 29, and June 16 decisions make it clear
that the Honduran court system had forbidden any affirmative action to
advance the populist referendum. But the courts made one final clarifying step
to ensure that President Zelaya would not proceed with his referendum. On
June 18, 2009, the Court of Administrative Disputes delivered a Judicial
Communication to President Zelaya that stated, in layman's terms, the scope
of the judicial orders.69 The Judicial Communication concluded by addressing
President Zelaya directly and demanding that he follow the prohibitions in the
May 27, May 29, and June 16 decisions.70
President Zelaya was also told that his referendum was unlawful by the
Honduran Public Ministry. The Public Ministry, in the Latin American legal
tradition, functions autonomously from the rest of the executive branch and
acts as the caretaker of the public interest." The Public Ministry is a cross
between an ombudsman's office and a special prosecutor; some conceptualize
the Ministry as a fourth branch of government. The Public Ministry is
designed to investigate all branches of government, including the president,
free of interference and the subjectivity that typifies the more political branches
of government.
June 18, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 17.
67 Id. (as translated by author).
68 Corte de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Appeals Court of Administrative
Disputes], June 16, 2009 (Hond.), in DOcuMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 22. The
actual appeal was made in the form of an "amparo," a legal instrument used in Latin America to
vindicate constitutional claims. In the same way the Anglo Saxon writ of habeus corpus is used to
vindicate personal liberty rights, the amparo is used to vindicate non-personal liberty rights.
69 Juzgado de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Court of Administrative Disputes],
June 18, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 17.
70 Id.
71 On its website, the Public Ministry describes its mandate:
An independent entity, funcionally [sic] unattached to all three branches of
Government, the Public Ministry was instituted on January the 6th, 1994,
through Legislative Decree No. 228-93. It's main functions are the
prosecution of all crimes and felonies, to ensure full compliance by all with
the Constitution and the law of the land, and to represent, to defend and to
protect the general interest of society.
Ministerio Pfiblico, http://www.mp.hn (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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On March 23, 2009, the head of Honduras's Public Ministry, Attorney
General72 Luis Alberto Rubi, announced that President Zelaya's referendum
was unconstitutional.73 Rubi explained that the Public Ministry was "plainly
convinced that neither the Constitution of the Republic nor the Electoral Law
for Political Organizations give the Republic's President the power to
administer any referendum."74 The Public Ministry's announcement concluded
by stating that "each person [who continues to participate in the unlawful
referendum] will be the subject of a criminal investigation and the Public
Ministry will present a case with the goal of having the competent judicial
authority impose the punishment previously established by the Penal Code."75
2. Zelaya Attacks the Military After It Supports the Judiciary
The head of the Honduran armed forces, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
General Romeo Orlando Visquez Veldsquez, responded to the judiciary's
decisions by announcing that the military would abide by the court's decision
and not support the referendum.76 General Vdsquez said the military was
caught in a difficult position because the Supreme Court had ruled earlier that
the referendum was illegal, but Zelaya had proceeded anyway and had ordered
the armed forces to provide security.77 Zelaya rewarded Visquez's respect for
the rule of law by removing him from command.78 The heads of the army,
navy, and air force resigned to show their support for Vasquez.79
The Supreme Court of Justice responded by reinstating General Vasquez a
little more than twelve hours after Zelaya had suspended him.8" Following the
72 While Rubi's position is generally translated to "Attorney General," his position is unlike
the general Anglo-Saxon conception of the term. As head of the Public Ministry, the Attorney
General is an independent advocate for the people against the government. See Decreto Numero
228-93, 27,241 LA GACETA, Jan. 6, 1994, available at http://www.ciprodeh.org.hn/Leyes%20
Descargables/MP.pdf.
7' Honduras: Fiscalia desautoriza llamado a consulta popular, supra note 6.
14 Id. (as translated by author).
71 Id. (as translated by author).
76 Honduras President Challenges Government over Referendum, CNN, June 25, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/anericas/06/25/honduras.general/index.html.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
" Corte Suprema de Justicia: Scala Constitucional [Supreme Court of Justice: Constitutional
Branch], June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 31; see also
Honduras President Challenges Government over Referendum, supra note 76.
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Supreme Court's decision, President Zelaya quipped that the Court should be
called the "Supreme Court of Injustice."'"
Zelaya also confronted the military in order to obtain his election materials.
The ballots Zelaya had printed in Venezuela had been impounded by the
Honduran military and were being kept at Fort Herndn Acosta Mejia.82 On
June 25, 2009, Zelaya organized a number of his supporters and marched on
Fort Mejia, confiscating the 814 boxes of Venezuelan-printed ballots.83 The
same day, President Zelaya published Decree PCM-020-2009, which stated
that the June 28, 2009 election would include a fourth ballot box for a vote on
the question: "Do you agree that the general election of 2009 should include
a Fourth Box where the populace can decide whether to convene a National
Constituent Assembly?" 4
As the public referendum was nearly about to proceed, Zelaya boasted to
President Chdvez that over 70% of the Honduran public supported the
referendum. 5 Upon hearing the news, Chdvez said that the events in Honduras
were a product of his government's influence on the continent.8 6 Chavez went
on to say that Honduras would follow the same path as Bolivia, Venezuela, and
Ecuador in convening a constituent assembly. 7
3. The Supreme Court of Justice Takes Action
On June 25, 2009, Attorney General Rubi followed up on his March 23
promise and charged President Zelaya with four crimes against the Honduran
state. 8 The next day, the Supreme Court of Justice acted on the charges and
issued an arrest warrant for President Zelaya 9 and a separate order to allow the
81 Honduras President Challenges Government over Referendum, supra note 76.
s Decreto Ejecutiro Nimero PLM-019-2009, 31,945 LA GACETA, June 25, 2009, at Al
(Hond.), in DOCuMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 112.
" See O'Grady, supra note 60 (noting that Zelaya "led a mob that broke into the military
installation where the ballots from Venezuela were being stored").
' Decreto Ejecutivo Nfimero PCM-020-2009, 31,945 LA GACETA, June 25, 2009, at A3
(Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 115.
85 Honduras: Fiscalia desautoriza llamado a consulta popular, supra note 6.
6 Id
87 Id.
88 Brief of Alberto Rubi, Fiscal General de la Repifblica, Corte Suprema de Justicia
[Supreme Court of Justice], June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CA.SO ZELAYA, supra
note 7, at 35.
9 Orden del Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.)
(Order to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), in DOcuMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 54.
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military to arrest President Zelaya in his home.90 According to one of the
arresting officers, the actual arrest was a "clean operation" that did not result
in injury to any party.9' President Zelaya, on the other hand, suggested that the
arrest was more turbulent.92 After the arrest, Zelaya was put on a plane bound
for Costa Rica and told not to return to Honduras.93
Even before President Zelaya's plane had landed in Costa Rica, the Court
of Administrative Disputes issued a three-part order: first, the court ordered the
armed forces to confiscate all materials related to the referendum; second, the
court ordered all governmental employees to assist the armed forces in their
confiscation efforts; and third, the court ordered the armed forces to use
whatever state institutions it believed necessary to complete the confiscation
order.94 President Zelaya's referendum had finally been put to rest.
4. The Congress Removes Zelaya from Power and Swears in a New
President
Following Zelaya's removal, the Honduran Congress convened to discuss
the actions taken by the Court and the military. The Congress overwhelmingly
voted "to strip Zelaya of his powers, with a resolution stating that Zelaya
'provoked confrontations and divisions' within the country."95 The Congress
then named Roberto Micheletti the new President of the Republic. 96 On
90 Orden del Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.)
(Order to Lieutenant Colonel Don Rene Antonio Hepburn Bueso), in DOCUMENTADA CASO
ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 55.
9' Marc Lacey, Leader's Ouster Not a Coup, Says the Honduran Military, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 2, 2009, at A6.
92 See Paul Kiernan et al., Coup Rocks Honduras, WALLST. J., June 29, 2009, at A 1 (quoting
Zelaya as stating, "I was awakened by shots, and the yells of my guards, who resisted for
about 20 minutes[;] ... [w]hen (the soldiers) came in, they pointed their guns at me and told me
they would shoot if I didn't put down my cellphone").
93 Id.
9 Comunicaci6n, Juzgado de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Court of
Administrative Disputes], June 26,2009 (Hond.) (Order from Danery Antonio Medal Raudales),
in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 59.
9' Honduran Congress Names ProvisionalPresident, CNN, June 28, 2009, http://www.cnn.
com/2009/WORLD/americas/06/28/honduras.president.arrested.
96 Id. The congressional session also included a reading of a document that proponents
claimed to be President Zelaya's resignation letter. The letter's authenticity is highly suspect,
and the American State Department believes that it is a forgery. The letter was not a basis for
the Congress's decision to remove Zelaya from the presidency. See id.; Orden del Corte
Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.) (Order to the Chairman
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June 28, 2009, the Supreme Court of Justice issued another opinion ratifying
Congress's actions and remanding Zelaya's case to the Unified Penal Court of
Tegucigalpa.97
HI. ZELAYA'S ACTIONS WERE UNLAWFUL BECAUSE HE VIOLATED THE
HONDURAN CONSTITUTION
The decision to arrest President Zelaya was based on a sound legal
foundation because the President had violated the law in at least four ways.
Zelaya was charged with four crimes: (1) one count of Crimes Against the
Form of Government; (2) one count of violating Articles 373, 374, and 375 of
the Honduran Constitution; (3) one count of Abuse of Authority; and (4) one
count of Usurpation of Duties. Additionally, President Zelaya arguably
violated Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution and could have
automatically been relieved of his presidential duties. This Article now
examines these crimes in turn.
A. A Crime Against the Form of Government
Zelaya's first crime stems from the manner in which he pursued his
referendum. Article 5 of the Honduran Constitution clearly states the two rules
for public referendums and consultations. First, referendums can only be
approved by a 2/3 vote of Congress.98 Second, only the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal can "convene, organize, and direct the public consultations."99 The
detailed role of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal exists for a reason; in order to
protect the integrity of a referendum, the Honduran Constitution mandates that
institutions outside of the inherently political presidency conduct elections.
President Zelaya violated Article 5 in two ways. First, he pursued his
referendum even though the legislature had not approved the measure by a 2/3
margin. Zelaya actively ignored these provisions and proceeded with his
referendum despite the lack of congressional approval. Second, President
Zelaya also violated Article 5 by ordering the National Statistics Institute, and
of the Joint Chiefs), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 54.
" Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 29, 2009 (Hond.), in
DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 85.
98 CONSTTrUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDuRAS [Constitution] art. 5.
9 Id. Also, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal must report the official results of the referendum
to the Congress no more than ten days after the election. Id.
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not the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to conduct the referendum.' Zelaya's
decision to have the ballots printed in Venezuela,' instead of having the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal administer the publication of the ballots, also
constituted an unlawful incursion upon the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's area
of responsibility. The Court of Administrative Disputes cited Article 5's
limitations in its initial March 27, 2009 decision.'0 2
Under the Honduran Penal Code, Crimes Against the Form of Government
can result in six to twelve years of prison time.'0 3 Acts that result in the,
"removal of all or part of the National Congress's, the Executive Power's, or
the Supreme Court of Justice's constitutional prerogatives and powers" are
considered Crimes Against the Form of Government."°
Crimes Against the Form of Government constitute an existential threat to
the Honduran republic. President Zelaya's wanton disregard for the separation
of powers and for explicit constitutional processes was exactly the type of
threat envisioned by the Constitution's inclusion of Crimes Against the Form
of Government.
B. Violation of Articles 3 73, 3 74, and 3 75
President Zelaya's second crime stems from his concerted attempt to
destroy the Honduran Constitution via a constituent assembly. Unlike its
American cognate, the Honduran Constitution includes a number of safeguards
against tampering with the form and structure of government. Article 373 of
the Honduran Constitution specifies that only one way exists to change the
Constitution: two-thirds of all members of Congress must vote in favor of the
change at two consecutive regular annual sessions.0 5 Article 374 goes on to
"o Brief of Alberto Rubi, Fiscal General de la Repfiblica, Corte Suprema de Justicia
[Supreme Court of Justice], June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra
note 7, at 35.
101 O'Grady, supra note 60.
102 Juzgado de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Court of Administrative Disputes],
May 27, 2009 (Hond.) (Opinion of Jorge Alberto Zelaya Zaldafia), in DOCUMENTADA CASO
ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 11.
103 C6DIGO PENAL [CP] art. 328(3) (Hond.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/co
untry,,NATLEGBOD,,HND,4562d94e2,46d7cebe2,0.html.
104 Id.
105 CONSTITUCI6N POL1TICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HoNDuRAS [Constitution] art. 373 ("La
reforma de esta Constituci6n podrd decretarse por el Congreso Nacional, en sesiones ordinarias,
con dos tercios de votos de la totalidad de sus miembros. El decreto seffalari al efecto el articulo
o articulos que hayan de reformarse, debiendo ratificarse por la subsiguiente legislatura
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specify that no amendment can ever change the country's democratic nature,
the Constitution's amendment procedure, or the limitations on presidential
reelection.16
In fact, in a chapter entitled the Inviolability of the Constitution, Article 375
explicitly forbids all constitutional changes that do not comply with the
procedure contained in Article 373:
This Constitution does not lose its validity... even when it has
been supposedly revoked or modified by any means or procedure
other than those provided for by the Constitution itself. In such
cases, any citizen, with or without political authority, has the duty
to help maintain or restore respect for continued validity.'07
Zelaya's referendum directly violated Articles 373, 374, and 375. The
public referendum was an end run around Article 373's amendment process,
and the subject of the referendum was forbidden by Article 374. Indeed,
Zelaya's constituent assembly is exactly the kind of "procedure other than
those provided for by the constitution" that prompts action by all citizens to
restore the constitution under Article 37518 The constitution is clear in its
limitations on amendment; even if he did not like those limitations, Zelaya was
lawfully bound to follow them.
President Zelaya defended his "non-binding" referendum by saying that it
was allowed under Article 5 of the Civil Participation Act of 2006.109 Under
ordinaria, por igual nfimero de votos, para que entre en vigencia.").
106 Id. art. 374 ("No podrAn reformarse, en ningin caso, el articulo anterior, el presente
articulo, los articulos constitucionales que se refieren a la forma de gobierno, al territorio
nacional, al periodo presidencial, a la prohibici6n para ser nuevamente Presidente de la
Repblica, el ciudadano que lo haya desempefiado bajo cualquier titulo y el referente a quienes
no pueden ser Presidentes de la Repiblica por el periodo subsiguiente.").
107 Id. art. 375 ("Esta Constituci6n no pierde su vigencia ni deja de cumplirse por acto de
fuerza o cuando fuere supuestamente derogada o modificada por cualquier otro medio y
procedimiento distintos del que ella mismo dispone. En estos casos, todo ciudadano investido
o no de autoridad, tiene el deber de colaborar en el mantenimiento o restablecimiento de su
afectiva vigencia.").
108 The Honduran Public Ministry characterized the violations of Articles 373, 374, and 375
as "Treason against the Nation" because it argued that the President had engaged in a forbidden
"supplanting of popular sovereignty or the usurpation of the powers therein." Brief of Alberto
Rubi, Fiscal General de la Repblica, Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice],
June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 35 (as translated by
author); see CONSTITUCI6N POL1TICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [Constitution] art. 375.
' Decreto Ejecutivo Nimero PCM-020-2009, 31,945 LA GACETA, June 25, 2009, at A3
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Article 5, all civil servants can convene a non-binding referendum to gauge
public opinion.l"1 The Civil Participation Act is a general statute that allows
civil servants to gauge the public opinion when "formulating proposed
solutions to the collective problems" the populace faces."' The Act can thus
be applied to most laws, referendums, and policy initiatives. Zelaya argued
that his referendum was lawful because the Honduran Congress had
recognized the use of opinion polls.
Zelaya's argument fails because the Honduran Constitution trumps the
Civil Participation Act; the Civil Participation Act cannot be used to ratify an
unconstitutional mechanism. As discussed supra, Article 373 of the
constitution states that there is only one way to amend the constitution and
Article 375 declares that all other attempts to amend the constitution are
invalid. Thus, the use of a non-binding referendum to convene a constitutional
revision assembly conflicts with Article 375's ban on extra constitutional
amendment procedures. Indeed, Article 4 of the Civil Participation Act
acknowledges that it is subordinate to the constitution: "the plebiscite,
referendum and caucuses, as instances of civil participation, will be executed
in conformity with those that established the Constitution and the laws .. ."112
Honduran law is substantially similar to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence with
respect to constitutional supremacy over statutory law. The Honduran
Constitution contains its own Supremacy Clause that declares constitutional
provisions control when a statute and the constitution conflict." 3 Therefore,
a question about a "Fourth Box" that would empower an unconstitutional
(Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 115.
"' Ley de Participaci6n Ciudana, 30,917 LAGACETA, Feb. 1,2006, at Al (Hond.), available
at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Honduras/Leyes/LeyParticipacion.pdf. Article 5 states:
La iniciativa ciudadana es un mecanismo de participaci6n mediante el cual el
ciudadano podr presentar las solicitudes e iniciativas siguientes: (1) Solicitar
que los titulares de 6rganos o dependencias pfiblicas de cualquiera de los
poderes del Estado, que convoque a la ciudadania en general, a los vecinos
de un Municipio, de un barrio o colonia, a gremios, sectores o grupos sociales
organizados, para que emitan opiniones y formulen propuestas de soluci6n a
problemas colectivos que les afecten. Los resultados no serAn vinculantes
pero si elementos de juicio para el ejercicio de las funciones del
convocante ....
Id.
... Id. at A3 (as translated by author).
"' Id. at A2 (as translated by author).
"1 CoNsTrrucI6N POLITCA DE LA REPBLICA DE HONDURAS [Constitution] art. 315 ("En
casos de incompatibilidad entre una norma constitucional y una legal ordinaria, el Juez aplicar-A
la primera.").
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
revision assembly is forbidden under Articles 373 and 375 of the Honduran
Constitution. President Zelaya's best legal argument is thus fatally defective
to a common constitutional principle that any first-year Honduran or American
law student should know.
C. Abuse ofAuthority
President Zelaya's third unlawful act was a result of his decision to ignore
repeated judicial opinions. Under Honduran law, a public servant is guilty of
"an abuse of authority and a violation of the duties of a civil servant" if the
public servant "fails to comply with the sentences, decisions or orders of a
superior authority made within the limits of its respective competency and
according to formal legal requirements.""' 4
The Honduran judiciary was crystal clear about its injunction against the
constituent assembly referendum, and President Zelaya was equally clear in his
refusal to comply. Various Honduran courts attempted to halt the referendum
on May 27, May 29, June 16, and June 18. Zelaya was undeterred, and as late
as June 25, 2009, believed that he was going to hold his referendum despite the
various judicial orders." 5 As the Public Ministry's brief stated: "[Zelaya]
refused, without reason or justification, to act in accordance or compliance
with the order given by a competent authority ....
Under the Honduran Penal Code, an abuse of authority could carry a
sentence of three months to six years."7 Additionally, civil servants who
continue to act in a judicially prohibited manner can be further fined."l8
114 C6DIGO PENAL [CP] art. 349(1) (Hond.), available at http://www.unher.org/refworld/cou
ntry,,NATLEGBOD,,HND,4562d94e2,46d7cebe2,0.html.
50'Grady, supra note 60.
16 Brief of Alberto Rubi, Fiscal General de la Repfblica, Corte Suprema de Justicia
[Supreme Court of Justice], June 25, 2009 (Hond.), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra
note 7, at 35 (as translated by author).
'" C6DIGO PENAL [CP] art. 349 (Hond.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/countr
y,,NATLEGBOD,,HND,4562d94e2,46d7cebe2,0.html ("Serd castigado con reclusi6n de tres (3)
a seis (6) afhos e inhabilitaci6n especial por el doble del tiempo que dure la reclusion, el
funcionario o empleado ptiblico que: (1) Se niegue a dar el debido cumplimento a 6rdenes,
sentencias, providencias, resoluciones, acuerdos o decretos dictados por las autoridades
judiciales o administrativas dentro de los limites de sus respectivas competencias y con las
formalidades legales.").
118 Id. art. 355 ("El funcionario que, legalmente requerido de inhabilitaci6n continfie actuando
antes de que quede resuelta la cuesti6n de competencia, serA sancionado con multa de cinco mil
(L. 5,000.00) a diez mil Lempiras (L. 10,000.00).").
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D. Usurpation of Duties 19
President Zelaya' s fourth unlawful act stems from his attempt to unlawfully
usurp the functions of the Supreme Election Tribunal. Article 354 of the Penal
Code forbids encroachment on another civil servant's duties: "[t]he civil
servant or [p]ublic employee who usurps duties belonging to another will be
punished with a term of two (2) to five (5) years, and a fine of five thousand
(L. 5,000.00) to ten thousand Lempiras (10,000.00) and a disqualification for
double the time of his term."'12 Zelaya violated this provision by attempting
to administer his own referendum.
The Honduran Election and Political Organizations Law 2' clearly defines
the duties of the Supreme Electoral Commission: "[t]he Supreme Electoral
Tribunal has the following responsibilities: . . . (5) [o]rganize, direct,
administer, and safeguard the electoral processes . . .[and] (8) convene
elections,.1..."22 The law entrusts the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and only
the Tribunal, 23 with the administration of elections in order to avoid the
perverse incentive structure that would result if the political branches ran their
own elections. The Honduran democracy, less than thirty years old, has
battled corruption its entire life. The wall between the administration of
elections and the President is an important step in ensuring the integrity of
Honduran elections.
Despite the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's clear mandate to conduct "public
consultations ... elections, referendums, and plebiscites,"'124 President Zelaya
nevertheless planned on having the National Institute of Statistics, an
119 The Penal Code uses the word "funciones." While I have translated this word to mean
"duties," the word could also be translated as "functions."
120 C6DIGOPENAL [CP] art. 354 (Hond.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/countr
y,,NATLEGBOD,,HND,4562D94e2,46d7cebe2,0.html ("El funcionario o empleado piiblico que
usurpe funciones propias de otro cargo sern sancionado con reclusi6n de dos (2) a cinco (5) aftos,
mis multa de cinco mil (L. 5,000.00) a diez mil Lempiras (L. 10,000.00) e inhabilitaci6n
especial por el doble del tiempo que dure la reclusi6n.").
121 In Spanish, "Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Politicas."
122 Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Politicas, art. 15(5)-(8), 30,390 LA GACETA, May
15, 2004, at A3 (Hond.), available at http://pdba.gerogetown.edu/Parties/Honduras/Leyes/codi
goelectoral.pdf ("Son atribuciones del Tribunal Supremo Electoral: ... (5) Organizar, dirigir,
administrar y vigilar los procesos electorales; ... [and] (8) Convocar a elecciones ....").
123 Id. art. 9, at A2 ("Corresponde al Tribunal Supremo Electoral, todo lo relacionado con
los actos y procedimientos electorales. Su integraci6n, organizaci6n y funcionamiento se regira
por lo preceptuado en la Constituti6n de la Repfiblica y la presente Ley.").
124 Id. art. 15(5)-(8), at A3.
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organization firmly within his political control, administer the referendum. '25
Zelaya's desire to have the election conducted in-house is especially apparent
given the fact that he had the referendum's ballots printed in Venezuela. 2 6
President Zelaya was guilty of an Usurpation of Duties, but if he had been able
to complete his plan he would have been liable for the far greater wrong of
casting doubt on the entire Honduran electoral process.
E. An Attempt to Remove Term Limits
In addition to the charges included in the Public Ministry's brief, President
Zelaya might have been liable for other constitutional infractions as well.
Former Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States Miguel Estrada,
a native Honduran, has argued that Zelaya's true goal was to remove
presidential term limits.' 27 If Zelaya was attempting to change the
constitution's prohibition on reelection, then he would be liable for treason. 2 '
The Honduran Constitution flatly forbids presidential reelection: "The
change in the exercise of the President of the Republic is obligatory. The
breach of this rule constitutes a crime of treason against the Nation."'29 The
Constitution goes on to say that "under no circumstances" can the ban on
presidential reelection be amended. 3° If a civil servant even proposes an
amendment to the prohibition on reelection, then that civil servant is
immediately relieved of his duties for ten years. '' The constitution's defense
125 Ejecutivo Ntimero PCM-020-2009, 31,945 LA GACETA, June 25,2009, at A3 (Hond.), in
DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 115.
126 See O'Grady, supra note 60.
127 See Miguel Estrada, Op-Ed., Honduras'Non-Coup: Under Honduras'Constitution, the
Ouster ofPresident ManuelZelaya Was Legal, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A29 ("[I]t was easy
to conclude... that [the referendum] was nothing but a backdoor effort to change the rules
governing presidential succession.").
128 CONSTrrucI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBUCA DE HONDURAS [Constitution] art. 4.
129 Id. ("La alternabilidad en el ejercicio de la Presidencia de la Repiblica es obligatoria. La
infracci6n de esta norma constituye delito de traici6n a la Patria.").
130 Id. art. 374 ("No podrdn reformarse, en ning6n caso, el articulo anterior, el presente
articulo, los articulos constitucionales que se refieren a la forma de gobiemo, al territorio
nacional, al periodo presidencial, a la prohibici6n para ser nuevamente Presidente de la
Repfblica, el ciudadano que lo haya desempeflado bajo cualquier titulo y el referente a quienes
no pueden ser Presidentes de la Repfiblica por el periodo subsiguiente.").
131 Id. art. 239 ("El ciudadano que haya desempeflado la titularidad del Poder Ejecutivo no
podr-A ser Presidente o Designado. El que quebrante esta disposici6n o proponga su reforma, asi
como aquellos que lo apoyen directa o indirectanente, cesardn de inmediato en el desempefto
de sus respectivos cargos, y quedarfin inhabilitados por diez aflos para el ejercicio de toda
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against presidential reelection is thus threefold: (1) reelection is prohibited
under Article 4, (2) the constitution cannot be changed to allow reelection
under Article 374, and (3) even proposing a change in the prohibition subjects
an individual to a ten year suspension under Article 239.
The Honduran Constitution's prohibition of presidential reelection is the
result of the country's tumultuous past. Honduras has bounced between
military dictators for decades: General Enrique Lopez Arellano ruled from
1963 to 1970 and again from 1972 to 1975; General Juan Melgar Castro ruled
from 1975 to 1978; and General Policarpo Paz Garcia ruled from 1978 to
1983.32 The framers of the Honduran Constitution developed this tripartite
prohibition to protect the nation from power centralization in the president.
Miguel Estrada writes that Zelaya's actions evidence a clear intent to alter
the constitution's reelection prohibition:
Earlier this year, with only a few months left in his term, [Zelaya]
ordered a referendum on whether a new constitutional convention
should convene to write a wholly new constitution. Because the
only conceivable motive for such a convention would be to
amend the un-amendable parts of the existing constitution, it was
easy to conclude -- as virtually everyone in Honduras did -- that
this was nothing but a backdoor effort to change the rules
governing presidential succession. 133
Estrada is correct in arguing that President Zelaya's actions, especially when
considered in the large Bolivarian populist context, suggest that Zelaya did
have his sights set on another presidential term (even if he would have had to
take some time off while the Constituent Assembly composed a new
constitution). But Zelaya never made reelection his explicit goal, and
establishing his intent in a court of law would be difficult. However, an
inability to establish Zelaya's intent to win reelection does not make his
removal unlawful; Zelaya was demonstratively guilty of the four violations
discussed supra. Put another way, President Zelaya broke enough laws in his
quest to break the Honduran Constitution's "Big Law" to justify his removal.
funci6n pfiblica."); see also Estrada, supra note 127 (stating that any president who even suggest
the permissibility of reelection must immediately cease all duties).
132 Llosa, supra note 56.
'3 Estrada, supra note 127.
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IV. DYING BY THE CONSTITUTION'S LETrER OR LIVING BY ITS SPIRIT:
THE LAWFULNESS OF THE DECISION TO REMOVE PRESIDENT ZELAYA
The other half of the coin in the debate surrounding the legality of Zelaya's
removal centers on the actions of the coordinate branches of government. The
actions of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Honduran Congress were
complicated by a 2003 amendment to the Constitution that removed the
presidential impeachment provision. 34 As explained more fully infra, the
amendment failed to specify an alternative approach for removing a president.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Justice, the military, and the Congress were forced
to deal with a president who ignored the Constitution while not having a clear
constitutional mechanism to remove that president.
A. The Supreme Court of Justice Correctly Interpreted the Constitution in
Light of a 2003 Amendment's Heavy Hand
The Honduran government substantially resembles the United States
government in that there are three branches of government: executive,
legislative, and judicial.'35 In this tripartite system of government, the Supreme
Court of Justice is entrusted with the interpretation of Honduran constitutional
law.'36 The Constitution grants the Supreme Court of Justice wide jurisdiction;
the Court can hear all claims over events that occur within Honduran
territory. 37 Additionally, the Court is specifically empowered to hear cases on
the constitutionality of presidential actions. 3 ' In fact, the Constitution
mandates that the Supreme Court of Justice must make a decision after the
Public Ministry presents charges against a president.'39 Given Zelaya's
134 Decreto No. 175-2003, 30,269 LA GACETA, Dec. 19, 2003, at A2 (Hond.).
t31 See CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HoNDuRAS [Constitution] art. 4 ("La
forma de gobierno es republicana, democritica y representativa. Se ejerce por tres poderes:
Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial, complementarios e independientes y sin relaciones de
subordinaci6n.").
136 See id. art. 308 ("La Corte Suprema de Justicia es el mAximo 6rgano jurisdiccional; su
jurisdicci6n comprende todo el territorio del Estado y tiene su asiento en la capital, pero podr-i
cambiarlo temporalmente, cuando asi lo determine, a cualquier otra parte del territorio.").
137 Id.
131 See id art. 313 ("La Corte Suprema de Justicia, tendri las atribuciones siguientes:... (5)
Conocer de los recursos de casaci6n, amparo, revisi6n e inconstitucionalidad de conformidad
con esta Constituci6n y la Ley ... ").
139 See idart. 305 ("Solicitada su intervenci6n en forma legal yen asuntos de su competencia,
los jueces y magistrados no pueden dejar de juzgar bajo pretexto de silencio u oscuridad de las
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grievous and systematic violations of the law outlined supra, the Court also
had little choice in finding the President guilty.
The Supreme Court of Justice faced a dilemma, however, in fashioning a
remedy for a president who increasingly ignored the Constitution. Prior
to 2003, the Constitution regulated the conduct of high government officials
in two ways. First, there was a broad immunity provision for congressional
delegates, who benefitted from "personal immunity ... if the National
Congress did not first declare just cause."' 4 ° Second, impunity could be
removed by the Congress because it had the power to impeach and "declare if
there is or is not just cause 4 ' against the President, Presidential Appointees,
Congressional delegates .... ,,42 In 2003, the Honduran Congress decided to
abolish the broad immunity explaining that "the institution of immunity has,
over time, suffered a gradual loss in its intrinsic value and original purpose...
coming to be wrongly considered as a synonym of impunity."'143 The Congress
passed Decree 175/2003, which amended the Constitution by repealing
Article 200's grant of immunity and Congress's power under Article 205(15)
to find "just cause."'"
Decree 175/2003 was a sloppy act of constitutional draftsmanship because,
in repealing the impeachment provision as part of the repeal of immunity,
the 2003 reform threw the baby out with the bath water. Article 205(15) served
a purpose independent of stripping Article 205's immunity; Article 205(15) also
explained how the judiciary and legislature could check a president's
unconstitutional behavior. By removing the constitution's explicit mechanism
for bringing charges against a sitting president, Decree 175/2003 opened the door
for future presidents to claim that there was no constitutional check on their
exercise of power. Decree 177/2003 had unwittingly advanced the cause of
presidential impunity in its attempt to subject public officials to the law.
When faced with President Zelaya's continued intransigence in the face of
repeated judicial mandates, the Supreme Court of Justice had no clear course
leyes."). Once they have been petitioned by a valid authority, "judges and magistrates cannot
refrain from making a judgment under the pretext that the laws are silent or unclear." Id.
(author's translation). Once the Public Ministry, in its role as the guardian of the constitution,
had brought charges against President Zelaya, the Court had to make a ruling.
,4o Id. art. 200(1), repealed by Decree 175/2003.
'4, In the original Spanish text, the term is "formaci6n de causa," translated literally as
"formation of cause." This concept is analytically akin to the idea of "just cause" in Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence, and I have translated it as such.
142 See id. art. 205(15), repealed by Decree 157/2003.
143 Decreto No. 175-2003, 30,269 LA GACETA, Dec. 19, 2003, at A2 (Hond.).
'44 Id.
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of action. On one hand, the Court could not allow a sitting president to openly
flout the Constitution and numerous judicial orders. On the other hand, the
obvious course of action, impeachment, had been precluded by the
Decree 175/2003's heavy-handed excision of constitutional text.
The Court correctly decided that a president was subject to the same judicial
mechanisms as all other Honduran citizens. The fundamental goal behind the
Decree 175/2003 was to remove immunity and to acknowledge "[t]hat all men
are born free and with equal rights, that in Honduras there are no privileged
classes and all are equal before the law."' 45 Consequently, the repeal of the
immunity and impeachment provisions should properly be interpreted to mean
that all citizens, regardless of position, would be subject to the same judicial
procedures. A president, or any other citizen, who violated the Constitution and
ignored judicial decrees would be subject to judicial authority. The Court's
decision to arrest President Zelaya reaffirmed Decree 175/2003's fundamental
goal by affirming that, in Honduras, no one is above the law.
B. The Military Acted Lawfully in Removing the President Pursuant to a
Lawful Judicial Order
For many claiming that Zelaya's removal was a coup d' tat, the gravamen
of the argument centers on the involvement of the Honduran armed forces. In
short, the presence of the military does not a coup d'tat make. In his seminal
work on the anatomy of a coup d'tat, Edward Luttwak defined a coup as "the
infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then
used to displace the government from its control of the remainder."'46 Other
scholars have articulated this concept by stating that "true coups d'etat" involves
"assumptions of power."' 47 Either way, the focus is on whether the coup
conspirators "displace" the lawful functioning of governments or "assume
power."'48
The Honduran military did not usurp power, nor did it assume power over
the Honduran State. Rather, the military remained wholly subject to civilian
control and only acted when directly ordered to do so by the Supreme Court
of Justice'49 or the Court of Administrative Disputes. 5 ° Power over the
145 Id.
14 LUTrWAK, supra note 3, at 12.
147 SAID & COLLIER, supra note 4, at 44.
148 See LurrWAK, supra note 3, at 12 ("[The coup is not necessarily assisted by either the
intervention of the masses, or, to any significant degree, by military-type force.").
141 Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.) (Order to
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government remained within the lawful chain of civilian succession, and
following Zelaya's removal, the Congress swore in Roberto Micheletti as
provisional president."' At no point did the military take control of the
process, and at no point did the military violate its constitutional mandate to
remain subordinate to the Constitution and civilian law.'52
In fact, once the Supreme Court of Justice signed Zelaya's arrest warrant,
the armed forces had to comply with the order. Article 375 of the Constitution
states that both the originators of unconstitutional activity as well as those who
subsequently go along with the unconstitutional activity, will both be held
accountable for their actions. 5 3 In other words, the "I was just following
orders" defense does not work under Honduran constitutional law. The
military did not have a choice in arresting President Zelaya pursuant to a
lawful judicial order; the military, just like the president, was subject to
judicial authority.
C. The Basis for Zelaya's Exile and the Congressional Decision to Remove
Him
The strongest argument in favor of the claim that Zelaya's removal
constituted a coup d'dtat centers on Zelaya's exile and removal from power.
It is generally conceded that the military's decision to put President Zelaya on
a plane bound for Costa Rica was an arbitrary exile that suffered from a lack
of due process.'54 But the exile would be nothing more than a "meritorious
General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 54;
Orden del Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 26, 2009 (Hond.) (Order
to Lieutenant Colonel Don Rene Antonio Hepburn Bueso), in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA,
supra note 7, at 55.
150 Comunicaci6n, Juzgado de Letras de lo Contencioso Administrativo [Court of
Administrative Disputes] June 26,2009 (Hond.) (Order from Danery Antonio Medal Raudales),
in DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 59.
5' Honduran Congress Names Provisional President, supra note 95.
152 SeeCONSTITUCI6NPOL1TICADELAREPTBLICADEHONDURAS [Constitution] art. 274 ("Las
Fuerzas Armadas estarin sujetas alas disposiciones de su Ley Constitutiva y a las demis Leyes
y Reglamentos que regulen su funcionamiento.").
153 See id. art. 375 ("Serin juzgados, segin esta misma constituci6n y las leyes expedidas en
conformidad con ella, los responsables de los hechos sefialados en la primera parte del prrafo
anterior, lo mismo que los principales funcionarios de los gobiemos que se organicen
subsecuentemente, si no han contribuido a restablecer inmediatamente el imperio de esta
Constituci6n y a las autoridades constituidas conforme a ella.").
154 See Estrada, supra note 127 ("No one has yet explained persuasively why summarily
sending Zelaya into exile in this manner was legal, and it most likely wasn't.").
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immigration beef" 5 if the Congress had not relied on the exile as the basis for
stripping Zelaya of his presidential duties. In the congressional resolution
removing Zelaya from power, the basis for removal centered on Articles 242
and 243 of the Constitution. 5 6  Those articles discuss the transfer of
presidential power in cases of presidential absences'57 or when the president
"fails to appear."'5 The problem is that the presidential absence was the result
of government action; Zelaya was attempting to return to the country but was
unable to do so.
A number of jurists have claimed that the Congress's actions were an
unlawful usurpation of power, thus qualifying the entire episode as a coup
d' tat. Probably the best articulation of this argument comes from the
American Society of International Law's (ASIL) Doug Cassel. In his
July 2009 article in the ASLL's Insights magazine, Cassel condemns the
Honduran government's actions:
In short, after being forced out of the country in breach of the
Constitution, President Zelaya was formally deposed by a
Congress with no clear constitutional power to remove him in the
circumstances at hand, let alone summarily, without so much as
a hint of due process of law. This was indeed a coup
d'tat .... 159
Cassel is correct in stating that the Honduran Congress had no "clear
constitutional power" to remove Zelaya, but his argument falters after that
point.
Cassel begins to have problems when he explains that the Honduran
Congress erred in not following the Constitution's lawful procedure for
removing Zelaya:
But a determination of whether or not Zelaya committed treason
is a matter for the Honduran Supreme Court, not Congress.
155 Id.
156 See Congreso destituye a Manuel Zelaya, LA TRIBUNA (Hond.), June 29, 2009, http://
www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=14265&print-l (outlining the reasons for Zelaya's removal and
attaching a copy of the Honduran Congress's decree that removed Zelaya).
117 CONSTITUCION DE LA REP&BLICA DE HoNDuRAs [Constitution] art. 242.
158 Id. art. 243 (as translated by author).
9 Doug Cassel, Honduras: Coup d'Etat in Constitutional Clothing?, ASIL INSIGHTS,
July 29, 2009, available at http://www.asil.org/files/insight090729pdf.pdf.
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Unlike common law constitutions, the Honduran Constitution
does not provide for impeachment and trial of a president by the
legislature. Instead, like most civil law constitutions in Latin
America, it grants Congress the initial power to determine
whether there are grounds to accuse the president of a crime.
Once Congress makes that determination, however, the Honduran
Constitution mandates that the case be adjudicated by the
Supreme Court, not by Congress.16°
Cassel is factually incorrect. The procedure he describes, and the
constitutional provision he cites, was repealed by Decree 175/2003.61 Simply
put, the procedure he advocates is no longer good law. Cassel's faulty
assertion of law highlights the central problem with congressional action: there
was no impeachment provision. Ifwe lived in the world Cassel described, then
the Honduran Congress would have acted unconstitutionally by ignoring a
clear impeachment procedure in favor of another approach. But we do not live
in that world, and the Honduran Constitution did not have an easy
constitutional option for removing presidents.
The Congress thus faced a Hobson's Choice similar to the dilemma the
Supreme Court of Justice had faced: the Congress could either allow a
president who disregarded the Constitution to continue to serve, or they could
remove him from power. They could either strictly adhere to the Constitution
in a way that would lead to its destruction, or they could construe the
constitution liberally in order to save the document. The Congress chose the
latter option.
As described supra, the legal authority the Congress cited in its resolution
to remove Zelaya was unpersuasive because the Congress argued that Zelaya's
absence warranted his removal. The Congress's best argument (but by no
means a perfect line of reasoning) would have instead relied on (1) the
Congress's power to "approve or disapprove" administrative conduct,'62 (2) the
Congress's power to confiscate, by majority vote, any profits from
unconstitutional activity,'63 and (3) the Honduran Penal Code's provision that
a crime against the form of government can result in the "removal ofall or part
160 Id.
161 Decreto No. 175-2003, 30,269 LA GACETA, Dec. 19, 2003, at A2 (Hond.). The current
version of the Honduran Constitution, hosted by the Honduran government, has replaced the text
of Article 205(15) with the phrase "Repealed by Decree 175/2003."
162 CONSTIUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [Constitution] art. 205(20).
163 Id. art. 375.
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of the National Congress's, the Executive Power's, or the Supreme Court of
Justice's [c]onstitutionalprerogatives andpowers.' '" 64 These three explicit
grants of power could be read to give Congress the right to take action against
unconstitutional administrative conduct that it disapproves of. Again, this is
not a completely satisfying legal argument, but a colorable one given President
Zelaya's unconstitutional behavior.
The situation the Honduran Congress faced is not unlike the situation faced
by American President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. The U.S.
Constitution allows the writ of habeas corpus to be suspended when two
qualifications are met (1) the suspension must involve a case "of [r]ebellion or
[i]nvasion," and (2) Congress must be the branch of government that suspends
the writ.'65 While the first qualification was met, President Lincoln did not
wait for Congress's approval before ordering his generals to detain any
individuals that presented a security risk. Lincoln defended his policy in a
Special Session to Congress on July 4, 1861, arguing that an ongoing
insurrection "[i]n nearly one-third of the States' had subverted the 'whole of
the laws.., are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?' ,166 Lincoln's argument was
simple: blind adherence to the letter of the law could sometimes destroy the
very constitution that adherence was meant to protect.
Similarly, the Honduran Congress decided that it would not allow Zelaya
to convene a constitutional convention to overthrow the existing Constitution.
In the face of an existential threat to the Republic, and aided only by a
constitution that included no impeachment provision, the Congress attempted
to carry out its charge to protect the Constitution. 167 Strictly following all of
the constitution's provisions was no longer an option; the Congress would
either read its impeachment power liberally or fail in Title VII's mandate to
protect the inviolability of the Constitution. The Congress could either die by
the letter of the law, or live by its spirit. While reasonable minds might
disagree over the sufficiency of the Congress's constitutional basis, the
'64 C6DIGO PENAL [CP] art. 328(3) (Hond.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/co
untry,,NATLEGBOD,,HND,4562d94e2,46d7cebe2,0.html (emphasis added).
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
166 DoRis KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RivALs: THE PoLITIcAL GENIus OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 355 (2005).
167 See CONST1TuCI6N POLMCA DE LA REPOBLICA DE HONDURAS [Constitution] art. 322
(stating that any public official in office makes a promise to enforce the constitution and its
laws).
[Vol. 38:339
THE HONDURAN CONSTITUTION IS NOT A SUICIDE PACT
important point is that the Congress's action was not a reckless act of legal
neglect.
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE HUBRIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TELLING THE HONDURAN SUPREME COURT HOW TO INTERPRET THE
HONDURAN CONSTITUTION
The legality of President Zelaya's removal collapses into whether the
Honduran Supreme Court, military, and Congress had the right to take their
respective actions. Several answers are clear: President Zelaya committed
numerous unconstitutional acts, the Supreme Court of Justice had the power
to order his arrest, and the military had the power to arrest Zelaya. An open
question exists as to the lawfulness of the Congress's actions to remove Zelaya
from power, but the legislature had several defenses, including: (1) a textual
line of reasoning stemming from Articles 205(20) and 375 of the Constitution
and Article 328(3) of the Honduran Penal Code; and (2) a policy argument
based on the holistic need to defend the Constitution in the face of an
existential threat. This Article does not claim that the Honduran government's
case is airtight; rather, this Article illustrates that the both sides have presented
reasonable cases.
The proper adjudicator of this Honduran constitutional law question is
obvious: the Honduran Supreme Court. They are the world's experts on the
Honduran Constitution, and they alone have jurisdiction over the issues. The
Supreme Court of Justice was therefore uniquely and supremely qualified to
issue its June 29,2009 opinion finding that the Congress had lawfully removed
Zelaya from power.'68
But the Supreme Court of Justice's opinion was not good enough for the
international community, and the nations of the world have already begun
punishing Honduras.'69 The hubris inherent in the international community
telling the Honduran Supreme Court how to interpret the Honduran
Constitution is astounding. From tautologies that any forcible removal of
power constitutes a coup'70 to polemics against any involvement by the
168 Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], June 29, 2009 (Hond.), in
DOCUMENTADA CASO ZELAYA, supra note 7, at 85.
69 See, e.g., US. Revokes Visas of4 Honduran Officials, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 28, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32194353/ (stating that American officials revoked four visas,
including the visas for the Supreme Court magistrate who ordered Zelaya's arrest).
170 See U.S. Permanent Mission to the Org. of Am. States, Teleconference Background
Briefing by Two Senior Department Officials on the Situation in Honduras (July 1,2009), http://
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military, 7 ' international critics have rushed to condemn without pausing to
consider the Honduran government's case. Just as the American Supreme
Court was justified in determining the scope of President Richard Nixon's
executive power in United States v. Nixon,172 so too was the Honduran
Supreme Courtjustified in determining the scope of the Honduran legislative
power. Simply put, the opinion of the Honduran Supreme Court trumps the
opinion of the world's pundits on issues of Honduran constitutional law.
Those who have called Zelaya's removal a coup are implicitly arguing that
the only valid doctrine of constitutional interpretation is strict textualism.
Otherwise, the Honduran Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice could
read the Constitution to give them the right to defend against rogue presidents
who trample the Constitution. But it is not for the international community to
tell Hondurans how to interpret their Constitution; their approach is theirs to
decide.
There is a fine line between the pretextual rationalizations that accompany
any coup d'dtat and bona fide constitutional questions. It is the province of
rational men and women to differentiate between the two. Put another way,
the issue is not whether the Honduran government's argument is stronger than
the international community's argument; the proper inquiry is whether the
Honduran government has established a reasonable basis for its actions. If the
government has established a reasonable basis, then the argument is not a
pretext and adjudication therefore falls to the Honduran Supreme Court. As
this Article has painstakingly detailed, the Honduran government has met this
burden in showing the constitutional basis for its actions.
Calling President Zelaya's removal a coup d'gtat cheapens the disdain with
which a true coup d'gtat should be regarded. A true coup d' tat involves an
assault on a constitution and not its defense. It is indeed ironic that, while it
was Zelaya who espoused a disdain for the Constitution, it was the
Constitution's defenders who have faced the world's wrath. Hopefully, time
will show the true wisdom behind the actions of the Honduran government.
www.usoas.usmission.gov/gahonduras ("In regard to the first question, both the President and
the Secretary have described events in Honduras as a coup, which they certainly were once the
current claimant to the presidency swore - was sworn in before the congress after the forcible
removal of the legal and constitutional president, Mel Zelaya.").
..' See Obama Remarks, supra note 13 ("I think it's - it would be a terrible precedent if we
start moving backwards into the era in which we are seeing military coups as a means of political
transition rather than democratic elections. The region has made enormous progress over the
last 20 years in establishing democratic traditions in Central America and Latin America.").
172 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Zelaya's opponents recognized that a constitution is more than just a list of
rules; it is a way of life. And it is worth defending.

